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1 Introduction
On the surface the quantity of money plays little or no active role in modern
macroeconomic models, with money pinned down by demand, production
and ination outcomes rather than exerting any independent source of
macroeconomic uctuations. Typically, it is the short term policy rate that
regulates aggregate demand and is used as the instrument of monetary policy,
with money supplied elastically to meet any idiosyncratic money market
shocks. In such models the policy interest rate is su¢ cient to understand
the constellation of market determined interest rates, and that money (or
liquidity) exerts no independent e¤ect on the economy and so becomes less
worthy of study (Goodhart, 2007). Accordingly, current monetary policy
practice is somewhat ambivalent about the role of monetary aggregates and
focuses on the ultimate objectives of policy, ination and employment.
On the one hand although there is widespread agreement that in the
long run there is, more or less, a one-to-one relationship between money
growth and ination and no relationship between money growth and real
quantities (see Lucas, 1996). Nevertheless, there is little consensus on what
role monetary aggregates should play in the conduct of monetary policy over
the short run when money might give a varying degree of guidance to short
run movements in output and ination. In this respect the European Central
Bank follows a two-pillar approach. The rst of these gives a prominent
role to money (Stark, 2008). The second pillar relies on a broadly based
assessment of the outlook for future price developments. By contrast the
Federal Reserve explicitly eschews any role for money in the conduct of
monetary policy. The Bank of England also places a less prominent weight
on money, not least because nancial liberalisation and changing payment
technologies have masked the inationary signal from growth in observed
money aggregates.1
However, at the same time the role of banks, other nancial institutions
and the nancial system - that provide liquidity and the markets in which
asset prices are set - are given particular prominence in discussions of the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy.2
..the cost and availability of nondeposit funds for any
given bank will depend on the perceived creditworthiness of
1See Meyer (2001), Woodford (2007a) and (2007b) and King (2002).
2See Bernanke et al (1999) for a clear exposition.
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the institution. Thus, the concerns of holders of uninsured
bank liabilities about bank credit quality generate an external
nance premium for banks that is similar to that faced by
other borrowers. The external nance premium paid by banks
is presumably reected in turn in the cost and availability of
funds to bank-dependent borrowers. Importantly, this way of
casting the bank-lending channel unies the nancial accelerator
and credit channel concepts, as the central mechanism of both
is seen to be the external nance premium and its relationship
to borrowers balance sheets. The only di¤erence is that the
nancial accelerator focuses on the ultimate borrowers  rms
and households whereas nancial intermediaries are the relevant
borrowers in the theory of the credit channel.Bernanke, 2007.
And so economists have not given up entirely on the idea that the
monetary aggregates can sometimes have information about the future state
of the economy, as well as about the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy.3 To borrow an analogy from Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) the ow
of money and private securities through the economy is analogous to the
ow of blood...money is the blood that dispatches resources in response
to those (price) signals (p. 5). More recently, and especially in the light
of recent turbulence in world nancial markets, economists have been re-
examining the role that money, and more generally credit or liquidity, can
play independently of the policy rate. One avenue we explore in this paper,
is motivated by the role of money as a supply of payment services to liquidity
constrained consumers. The premium price of such loans reects the marginal
costs to banks of their supply and so it responds to increases in supply
e¢ ciency relative to demand for liquidity. This relative price can move
out of line with the policy rate set by the central bank when there are
independent sources of utuations to the ability of banks to supply liquidity,
for example, as a result of their e¢ ciency in screening loans or the value of
posted collateral.
Although it is widely agreed that the external nance premium - the
di¤erence between the opportunity cost of internally generated nance and
the cost of issuing equity or bonds - represents a signicant nancial friction
or wedge, there is no clear economy-wide proxy.4 In Figure 1 we therefore
3See Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2003) and (2007) for a discussion of these issues.
4Levin, Natalucci, and Zakrajek (2004) use a combination of bond market and balance
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illustrate with one measure of the external nance premium (EFP) for the
US. This is the di¤erence between Moodys Aaa and Baa rated long maturity
corporate bond rate. We also include a plot of the growth of real (M2)
money balances. For much of the period the external nance premium and
the growth in real money balances are positively related suggesting that
the demand for real money balances tends to be associated with increases
in the EFP - reecting positive demand shifts in the demand for money.
However, from the mid-1990s the relationship breaks down as increases in
real money balances seem to lead to a compression of the EFP, which suggests
that positive supply shifts to the supply of broad monetary balances were
dominant in the money market(s).
In this paper we examine the conditions under which monitoring money
might add usable information about the current and prospective state of
the economy. The key insight is whether observed money aggregates reect
a dominance of supply or demand shocks in the money market and thus
whether observed interest rate spreads reect aggregate demand driven
need for higher levels of money balances or whether the supply of funds
exogenously creates more money (or liquidity) and drives down interest rate
spreads. We show how nancial conditions, as represented by the external
nance premium, feed back into aggregate demand and require the attention
of monetary policy makers over and above that suggested by a simple interest
rate rule that focuses on ination alone.5
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we consider the role of
money in a standard modern macro model and show that it is endogenous to
the equilibrium for output and ination and consider with a simple example
what happens to the stabilising policy rule when market interest rates, which
clear the money and spending markets, are disconnected from the policy
rate. In Section 3, we re-examine the role of money for policy in the context
of Goodfriend and McCallums (2007) model which incorporates a banking
sector into a DSGE model and reconnects the money market and nancial
sheet information to calculate the EFP at the level of rms. De Graeve (2007) estimates
the EFP from a DSGE model. See also Chadha et al (2008).
5Although, it is reasonably clear that even ination targeting policymakers do concern
themselves with output uctuations and this is even more clear under the Federal Reserves
dual mandate (see, for example, Mishkin, 2007), as the two-sector economy we study
involves the supply of banking services as an intermediate good, we concentrate on the
implications of strict ination targeting as a proxy for a central bank that does not pay
attention to monetary aggregates as an intermediate target.
4
spreads back to equilibrium output and ination. From impulse responses
generated from a calibration of the model dynamics around steady-state
paths, we show that under an ination targeting policy, money and nancial
spreads become negatively correlated when shocks to the supply of bank loans
dominate those to money demand or to goods sector productivity. Section 4
explores the conditions under which money provides a reliable signal about
ination and output and suggests a simple augmented rule to capture the
signal. That is we observe that when supply shocks dominate in the money
market, spreads and money will move in opposite directions and so a rule
that employs information from the di¤erence in money and spreads may be
better able to stabilise the economy. This rule is shown to better stabilise the
economy compared to a simple ination targeting rule. Section 5 concludes
and o¤ers some directions to future work.
2 Endogenous Money?
The debate on the use of money in macroeconomic models can be considered
at a number of levels. First, whether it is su¢ cient simply to append a
money demand function to a standard New Keynesian framework to deal
with the question of the money market. We show the consequences of
such an approach in this section. Then we may wish to consider whether
perturbations to money markets, which broadly-speaking price and allocate
broad money, can feedback into the determination of output and ination
such that these need to be considered as a separate channel when setting
monetary policy (Meier and Müller, 2005). In the rst instance we can
consider a simple model of money demand (for which supply is implicitly
perfectly elastic) appended to a standard New Keynesian framework
(see McCallum (2001) and King (2002)), which uses a monopolistically
competitive supply side with Calvo price setting. In this section we examine
in this simple setting what role money plays in determining equilibrium and
show that money is essentially decoupled and plays no signicant role in
the determination of equilibrium. We also then consider the equilibrium
conditions when money and output are allocated by market interest rates,
which may be decoupled from policy rates. In the subsequent, we explore in
more detail the implications of this possibility in a model that re-establishes
a key role for money in determining equilibrium by endogenising the supply
of money via the banking sector.
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We set up a simple NewKeynesian model where all variables are expressed
as log deviations from steady-state. Equation (1) gives aggregate demand,
yt, as a function of this periods expectation, Et; of demand next period,
yt+1, and of the expected real interest, where Rt is the policy rate, Ett+1
is the next period expectation of ination and  is the intertemporal rate
of substitution in output. This intertemporal equation also operates as the
basic asset pricing equation in a New-Keynesian model. Equation (2) is the
forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve that relates current ination,
t, to discounted expected next period ination, where  is the subjective
discount factor, and is proportional to the deviation of aggregate demand
from supply, where  is the slope of the Phillips curve.6 Equation (3) says
that real balances, mt pt, are held in proportion to demand, yt, and inversely
with the opportunity cost of holding non-interest paying money, Rt, with a
semi-elasticity, . Equation (4) is a simple interest rate-based rule that is used
to stabilise ination about its steady state value with the weight on ination
given by . The supply side of the economy, ~yt, which we interpret as the
ex-price level of output is given by (5). Finally, the forward-looking Phillips
curve, (2), determines the split between current and expected ination as a
function of the current output gap but we can use the current ination rate
to back out the price level:  is the fraction of rms that hold prices xed and
so (1  ) is the fraction which are given a signal to re-price as a mark-up
over marginal costs (see Yun, 1996) thus ination is simply the ratio of rms
that re-price at the new price level, pt, relative to those that cannot re-price,
(6).
The system is subject to stochastic shocks, A;t, B;t, C;t, D;t, E;t which
are respectively to demand, mark-up, money markets, monetary policy and
to aggregate supply.
yt = Etyt+1    (Rt   Ett+1) + A;t (1)
t = Ett+1 +  (yt   ~yt) + B;t (2)
6The term  is related to two deep parameters in the underlying Calvo-Yun model (see
Yun, 1996): the probability of rms maintaining a xed price in the next period,  , and the
subjective discount factor, : In ination space  can be shown to be equal to (1 )(1 )
and thus in price space, with the deviation in the price level proportional to ination (see
equation 6), the Phillips curve becomes: pt = Etpt+1+(1  ) (yt  y^t)+ 1  A;t: Under
either formulation ination or the price level is less responsive to the output gap as  ! 1:
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mt   pt = yt   Rt + C;t (3)
Rt = t + D;t (4)
~yt = E;t (5)
t =
1  

pt: (6)
We can substitute (4) into (1), (5) into (2) and solve (6) for pt and
substitute into (3) to give us a system of three di¤erence equations that
can be written in vector form, if we suppress the stochastic errors, as:
Etxt+1 = xt; (7)
where the transpose of the vector of state variables xt is:
x
0
t 

yt t mt

;
where  is a 3 x 3 matrix. The existence or not of a unique solution
for xt, as is well understood, given the forcing processes, t,7 will depend
upon matching the number of eigenvalues of the matrix  within the unit
circle with the number of predetermined state variables (see, for example,
Blanchard and Kahn, 1980). And typically the coe¢ cients of the policy rule,
(4), are set to ensure local determinacy.8
What concerns us here though initially is the role, if any, that money,
mt, plays in this economy. And so we note that matrix, , can be written in
block form, where each block is a 2 x 2 matrix:
 =
24  + 1     0 

1

0
1  
  ( + (   1) ( + ))  + 1  ( + (   1) ( + )) 0
35
=

A 0
C D

:
7Which is an analagous 3 x 1 vector for the shocks.
8See Woodford (2003) for a comprehensive treatment of this problem.
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The block triangularity of matrix  means that its eigenvalues are simply
given by the eigenvalues of A; referring to

t yt

and D, referring to
[ mt] : But also that the determinacy of  follows from the determinacy of
A given D is a null matrix. In this case, with both ination and output
non-predetermined then determinacy will require matrix A to have two
eigenvalues outside the unit circle and for a positive Tr(A) that will require
the Det(A)  Tr(A) >  1, for which a necessary and su¢ cient condition is
that:
 > 1; (8)
which is the familiar condition that real rates must increase (decrease) by
more than any positive (negative) ination shock. The solution is recursive in
that as long as ination and output are pinned down to a unique solution path
then the money stock (and the price level) is (are) also determined in each
period. In other words there is simply no role in this economy for the money
stock to destabilise the economy independently. To break this result we need
a separate supply function for money which will create some disequilbria in
the money market and thus some impetus to nominal expenditures or some
cause for disconnect across interest rates, so that the interest rate entering
the policy rule is not necessarily the same as the return from bonds or other
risky investments.9 To illustrate the mechanism, which we will explore in the
subsequent section, let us posit a simple mechanism for an external nance
premium, which determines equilibrium in the broad money market and also
impacts on aggregate demand, such that the premium is countercyclical:10
efpt =  yt; (9)
so that market interest rates become:
Rmt = Rt + efpt
and equation (1) and (3) is then solved with market interest rates, Rmt ,
rather than the policy rate, that is market interest rates clear the output and
money markets:
9We outline the various nancial spreads resulting from this model in Section 3.
10There is a large literature on the countercyclicality of risk premia and we develop
a micro-foundation for this possibility in the subsequent section. For a recent empirical
motivation for this point see Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005).
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yt = Etyt+1    (t   yt   Ett+1) (1)
mt   
1   t = yt   t + yt (3)
= (1 + ) yt   t:
In this case the recursion result still obtains because the 0 matrix takes
the following form, so that money can be thought possibly to not matter
provided the system remains determinate:
0 =
24    + 1     0 

1

0
1 2 0
35 ;
where 1 =   (+ 1) (  1)     ( + (   1) ( + + )) and
2 =
1
  ( + (   1) ( + + )) +  (+ 1). But the determinacy
conditions for the A0 matrix are found to depend crucially on the way in
which market interest rates move with the cycle:
 >
 (1  )

+ 1: (10)
The altered conditions tell us that if money is provided at an interest
rate that di¤ers from the policy rate, Rt, which itself varies with the level
of demand in the economy, , the monetary policymaker has to o¤set that
spread as well as ensuring the policy rate increases or decreases the real rate
alongside the level of demand. In other words the price at which money
is supplied by the banking system might matter. The model examined in
the following section gives us a micro-founded route to the result here and
starts to ll in the missing arguments of a typical NK model by ensuring that
the money supply feeds back to perturb both aggregate demand and policy
makers.
3 A General Equilibrium Monetary Model
with Banking
As pointed out by Goodhart (2007) and by Kiyotaki and Moore (2001)
money (aggregates) should be reconnected to general equilibrium models
9
as they a¤ect consumption decisions of liquidity constrained households and
the spreads across several nancial instruments and assets. And as Woodford
(2007a) states money mattersin such circumstances as it may be the root of
disequilibrium and instability in the economy originating from the nancial
sector. So we consider a model that will allow us to ll in elements of the 
matrix.
A convenient way to incorporate money and nancial spreads (asset
prices) into a general equilibrium setting is to study the banking sector
proposed by Goodfriend and McCallum (2007).11 The main feature of
this model is the underpinning of household, production and the monetary
authority with a banking sector. Households, who are liquidity constrained,
decide the amount of consumption and the amount of labour they wish to
supply to the goods production sector and to the banking sector. They
also demand deposits, money (liquidity), as a function of the amount of
consumption they wish to nance.
The production sector is standard (Yun, 1996), characterised by
monopolistic competition and Calvo pricing, adopts a standard Cobb-
Douglas production function with capital and labour subject to productivity
shocks. Prot maximising rms decide the amount of production they wish to
supply and the demand for labour. By clearing the household and production
sectors we can dene the equilibrium in the labour market and in the goods
market. These two sectors also provide the standard relationship for the
riskless interest rate and the bond rate. That is with the standard equations
(1), (2) and (4), from Section 2, dropping out.
We now turn to the analysis of how the banking sector a¤ects the
economy. The key assumption is that the banking sector matches deposit
demands from liquidity constrained consumers from a loan producing
technology. Specically, banks substitute monitoring work for collateral in
supplying loans. Increasing monitoring e¤ort is achieved by increasing the
amount of people employed in the banking sector and therefore reducing the
employment in the goods production sector. At the same time households
consumption is a¤ected by the availability of loanable funds. We assume
a fractional reserve requirement with a xed reserve-deposit ratio.12 Given
this technology banks decide the amount of loans they can supply and the
11See also Gilchrists comment (2008) on Goodfriend and McCallums model (2007).
12In a separate paper, we analyse the implications of an endogenous choice of bank
reserve holdings. We nd that this has serious implications for the question of whether
central banks should pay interest rates on bank reserves. See Chadha and Corrado (2008).
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demand for monitoring work:13
ct = vtc+ (1  )(mt + a2t) + 

b
b+ k1
(bt + ct) +
k1
b+ k1
(qt + a3t)

: (11)
With the presence of a cash in advance constraint, a shock to velocity,
vt; will increase consumption. Consumption is also positively a¤ected by
the amount of monitoring work, mt; where (1   ) represents the share
of monitoring costs in the loan production function and by the amount
of collateral represented by bonds, bt, and capital whose value is given by
qt. A positive shock to monitoring work, a2t; by increasing the e¢ ciency
of banking e¤ort in producing loans will increase the supply of loans and
therefore consumption. Similarly a negative shock to collateral, a3t; by
reducing the price of capital, qt; will negatively a¤ect consumption. The
parameters c, b and k1 represent the steady-state fraction of consumption
in output, the holding of bonds and a composite parameter reecting the
inferiority of capital compared to bonds as liquidity.14
The demand for monitoring work is given by:
mt =  wt   (1  )c
mw
(ct +


t): (12)
A higher wage level, wt; will reduce monitoring work. Similarly it will
be a¤ected by the gap between the marginal utility of consumption and the
marginal value of household fund, t:15 The steady state parameters, m, w,
and 

represent the steady-state proportions of employment in the banking
sector, the level of the real wage, and the ratio of weight of consumption in
the utility function relative to the steady-state shadow value of consumption.
With a banking sector of this type in the model, we can reconnect money
and asset prices back to output and ination, as consumption, which accounts
for most of output uctuations in this model, is closely dependent on money
13For details on the model set-up, derivation and notation see the technical appendix.
We follow McCallum and Goodfriends terminology as closely as possible in this section.
The bank balance sheet and loan production function is key and outlined in the appendix.
14The parameter k1 =
(1+)kK
c is a function of the ratio of consumption to output, c, of
the parameter reecting the inferiority of capital as collateral, k; of steady-state capital,
K; and of the trend growth rate, . Details of the derivation are reported in the Technical
Annex pages 7-8, equation (A.3).
15Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) assume log utility.
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market perturbations, the development of banking technology and asset
prices outcomes. Now money and lending a¤ect consumption and the level
of economic activity and have also important implication for asset prices.
A key term to consider as well is the marginal value of collateralised
lending, which increases as consumption rises and falls as collateral becomes
more widely available:

t =
k2
b+ k2
(ct   qt   a3t)  b
b+ k2
bt; (13)
which depends on the value of the collateral, qt and bt, on a collateral shock,
a3t; and on consumption. Higher levels of consumption increase the marginal
value of capital and hence the collateral value, q: The increase in collateral
value leads to more borrowing and more consumption. The parameter k2 is
again a composite coe¢ cient similar to k1:16
The marginal value of collateralised lending also feeds back into the
capital asset price equation:
qt = (1 + 1) (Ett+1   t) + 1Etqt+1  
k

c
(ct + t) + (14)
k
(

c
  1) (
t + a3t) + 1Et [mct+1 + (1  ) (nt+1 + a1t+1)] :
In (14) the marginal value of collateralised lending, 
t; can potentially
amplify asset price volatility and enrich the response of the economy to both
real and nancial shocks. Both real, a1; and nancial shocks, a3; directly
feed back into asset prices alongside the expected marginal productivity of
capital [mct+1 + (1  ) (nt+1 + a1t+1)] where mct+1 denotes the marginal
costs in period t + 1 and n is employment in the goods production sector.
Similarly expected asset prices, Etqt+1; the change in the shadow value of
householdsfunds (Ett+1   t) alongside the wedge between marginal utility
of consumption and the shadow value of funds are also a¤ecting the capital
value, qt. The parameter 1 is a composite function of the depreciation rate
of capital while the parameter 1 is a composite function of the steady-state
16The parameter k2 = kKc is a function of the parameter reecting the inferiority
of capital as collateral, k, of steady-state capital, K; and of the steady-state ratio of
consumption to output, c: Details of the derivation are reported in the Technical Annex
pages 8, equation (A.11).
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marginal costs, of the steady-state employment in the goods sector and of
the capital share in the production of goods.17
3.1 Interest Rate Spreads
The last building block in the Goodfriend and McCallums (2007) model is
the determination of interest rate spreads. Table 1 describes in a nutshell
the set of interest rate spreads delivered by the model. The benchmark
theoretical interest rate RT is simply a standard intertemporal nominal
pricing kernel, priced o¤ real consumption and ination. Basically it boils
down to a one-period Fisher equation:
RTt = Et(t   t+1) + Ett+1: (15)
The di¤erence betweenRT and the so-called interbank rateRIB is equal to
the marginal product of loans (L), per unit of labour, (1 ) Lt
mt
; and to their
marginal cost, wt
Pt
:18 The interbank rate RIB is less than RT by the extent
of the uncollateralised external nance premium, which is the premium paid
by the private sector for loans:
RIBt = R
T
t   [vt + wt +mt   ct]| {z }
EFPt
: (16)
The uncollateralised external nance premium, EFPt; is the real marginal
cost of loan management, and it is increasing in velocity, vt; real wages, wt;
monitoring work in the banking sector, mt; the share of collateral cost in loan
costs () ; reserve requirements (rr);19 and decreasing in consumption, ct.20
17The parameter 1 =
(1 )
1+ is a function of the discount factor, ; of the depreciation
rate of capital, ; and of the trend growth rate, : The parameter 1 =
mc
1+ (
n
K )
1  is
function of steady-state employment in goods sector, n, of steady-state marginal costs,
mc; of steady-state capital, K; and of the parameter reecting the capital share in the
production function of the goods sector, . Details of the derivation are reported in the
technical appendix, see equation (A.12).
18Note that with a fractional reserve system the following relationship holds Lt =
Dt(1   rr) = ctPtVt (1   rr) where L is the amount of loans, D are deposits and rr is
the fractional reserves/deposit ratio.
19As these two parameters are both constant in this paper they do not appear in the
log-linearisation, we relax this assumption in other work.
20The collateralised external nance premium is simply the uncollateralised external
nance premium multiplied by (1  ), i.e. the share of monitoring costs in loan costs, and
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The yield on government bonds is the benchmark rate, RT ; minus the
liquidity service on bonds:
RBt = R
T
t  



c
(ct + t) 


c
  1



t

; (17)
where (ct + t) measures the household marginal utility relative to
households shadow value of funds while 
 is the marginal value of the
collateral. It is, in fact, these key margins - the real marginal cost of loan
management versus the liquidity service yield - that determine the behaviour
of spreads in this model.
Finally the monetary authorities, who set the interbank lending rate, are
assumed to follow an ination targeting rule, as equation (4) in Section 2,
using the interbank interest rate as an instrument:
RIBt = t + t: (18)
In this section we have outlined the McCallum and Goodfriend model and
explained how it explicitly links output to developments in the monetary
sector and how the interaction between those sectors determine nancial
spreads. In following section we shall analyse the key responses of the model
to a series of shocks and try to infer what is the relationship between money
and ination, via nancial spreads.
3.2 Impulse Responses
In this section we describe, briey, the e¤ects of a series of shocks to
productivity, velocity and to two types of shocks to the nancial sector. The
simulation is carried out by running random number generation in Matlab.
Following a xed random seed, we generate a set of normal distributed
exogenous shocks of the length K = 10; 000. These random shocks are
feeded into the recursive law of motion of key variables described by the
model solution for which see the technical annex. As well as the impulses
and the asymptotic moments shown for Figures 2-9, for Figure 10, we pick
the central 100 observations of the large-sample simulation and obtain the
it is less than the uncollateralised external nance premium. As the shares  and (1  )
are constant both the collateralised and uncollateralised versions of the EFP coincide when
loglinearised.
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HP ltered series. Table 2 gives the moment choice on the forcing variables.
The full set of parameter choices is set out in the technical annex.
The dynamics of the model suggest that a key role is played by the
external nance premium as a regulator of demand. For example, any shock
that raises collateral value will increase the supply of loans. At the same
time the collateral shock will increase the demand for deposits and therefore
the amount of monitoring work that needs to be carried out by banks. So
the increase in the amount of employment in monitoring work will increase
the real marginal cost of the management of loans and so the positive e¤ect
of higher collateral will be attenuated.
Figure 2 describes the e¤ects of a shock, a1; to goods productivity.21
Under the ination targeting rule ination is stabilised. Hence hours worked
in the goods production sector, n; and the benchmark rate RT are almost
invariant to the shock.22 However c; w; q; m are all higher. In fact with hours
worked in goods production relatively stable, increased productivity shows up
as higher consumption c and higher real wages w: Also increases in q reects
a higher marginal product of capital. The increase in monitoring hours m
reects the increased demand for and supply of deposits. The combined
e¤ect is to increase the EFP: But as we have pointed out the movement of
money (deposits/loans) in the same direction as the external nance premium
implies that money would be a poor indicator of nancial conditions.
Figure 3 describes the e¤ects of a shock to banking productivity, a2.
Again under ination targeting the rule is stabilising and therefore so is
the benchmark interest rate RT . Because of higher banking productivity,
monitoring hours, m; decline while there is little e¤ect on the value of
collateral q; on consumption c and on real wages w: The combined e¤ect
is to decrease the EFP and so here money might indicate some loosening of
nancial conditions.
Figure 4 reports the e¤ects of a negative shock to collateral, a3. Under
21The benchmark model has 20 endogenous variables fc; n;m;w; q; P; ;mc;H;
b;
; EFP;RT ; RB ; RIB ; RL; RD; ; ; Tg, 5 lagged variables fP 1;H 1; c 1; b 1; RB 1g
and 6 exogenous shocks fa1; a2; a3; "; ; g. The full set of derivation of the model
with a detailed description of the calibrated values for the parameters and the
Matlab le using the King-Watson algorithm for the impulse response are available
on request. See Chadha and Nolan (2007) for exposition of these techniques in
more detail.
22For RTt this happens as RTt = t + Ett+1   Ett+1 where the ination rate 
and changes in  are almost zero.
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ination targeting ination is stable and so is the benchmark interest rate
RT : There are implied small changes in c and w: As we have a negative shock
on collateral there will be a rise in monitoring hours m: The joint e¤ect is to
increase the EFP, alongside a fall in the quantity of money.
Figure 5 reports the e¤ect of a positive shock to velocity v with an
ination targeting rule. There is an increase in c; w; n and ination. Because
the capital/labour ratio is lower, the price of capital q rises while hours of
monitoring,m, decrease. The joint e¤ect is a decrease in the EFP and a fall in
the money supply. Note that in each case the direction of the liquidity service
yield is well explained by the direction of the external nance premium and
so we concentrate on understanding the responses of the EFP to shocks.23
And we nd that money plays a crucial role in driving the EFP when the
banking sector itself is the source of the shock (i.e. monitoring e¢ ciency
and/or collateral shocks) with banks becoming more or less able to supply a
given quantity of loans. It is this independent source of supply shocks to the
loanable funds market drives the EFP in the opposite direction to that of
the quantity of loans and so can act to compress (unwind) yields when there
liquidity becomes abundant (scarce).
4 A Policy Rule with Money
The previous section has shown that nancial conditions might matter when
setting monetary policy. The model properties are summarised in Table 3.
Shocks to productivity and to velocity have symmetric e¤ects on money and
the external nance premium. A positive shock to productivity raises both
the demand for money and the external nance premium. A negative shock
to velocity has a similar e¤ect. However, a negative shock to the nancial
system originating in a rise in the cost of monitoring loans or a reduction
in the collateral of borrowers has a di¤erently signed e¤ect on money and
on the external nance premium. Even though we do not observe the shock
to monitoring and to collateral directly we can infer it indirectly from a
change in the spread between money and the external nance premium. So
a positive shock to either monitoring or collateral will increase the spread
while a negative shock will reduce it. This suggests that the spread can be
23The liquidity service yield is sensitive to ination dynamics and as these are relatively
stable here the yield varies little, we explore this spread in other work.
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used to inform monetary policy, that is to say as well as reacting to ination
directly the central bank can also respond to the spread.
We can illustrate the extent that there may be join information from
money and the external nance premium in terms of the volatility of ination
and output.24 The ratio of the variance of nancial and real and velocity
shocks is:
m :
mon + col
prod + vel
:
Figure 6 traces out the e¤ect of a steadily rising ratio of nancial
(numerator) to productivity and velocity shocks (with m on the x-axis) in
the model outlined in Section 3 with an ination targeting central bank. The
right hand-side vertical axis measures the correlation between the external
nance premium and money. As the variance of shocks to collateral and
monitoring rises, in our simulations, the correlation falls and eventually
becomes negative. The variance of ination rises with the relative variance
of the nancial shocks and clearly suggests that an ination targeting central
bank will be failing to exploit the joint information from money and the
external nance premium.
And so let us now assume that the monetary authority augments its
ination targeting rule with a term in the spread:
RIBt = t + m(Ht   EFPt) + t; (19)
where H is money and EFP is the external nance premium.25 In Figure
7 we vary the loading m on the spread, holding the variance of the shocks
xed with m = 30. We note that the variance of ination is initially
declining in m. And so it seems clear that over some range when nancial
shocks are dominant ination can be better stabilised. For this illustrative
24Given the primitive utility function, we could trace out the direct welfare consequences
for the representative household but as these are typically found to be proportional to the
variance of ination and output, we trace these paths for simplicity. See Woodford, 2003.
25Given the bank balance sheet Ht + Lt = Dt and Dt = Lt=(1   rr) it follows that
Ht = rrDt: So in a log-linearised version of the model high-powered money, Ht; is equal
to the level of deposits, Dt; and therefore loans, Lt.
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calculation the variance is minimised for m = 1 but clearly the optimal
weight will depend on m.26 This calibration result mimics the analytical
result in Section 2, (10), which showed that the policy rule needs to o¤set
the EFP. In this simulation at least, the Central Bank best achieves the
stabilisation of ination by exactly o¤setting any narrowing or widening of
the spread between the external nance premium and money in this model.
The impulse responses when this augmented rule (m = 1) is used are
shown in Figures 8 and 9. The results for both the augmented (solid) and
benchmark (dotted) rule are plotted. We conne ourselves to depicting the
e¤ects of a negative shock to collateral and a positive shock to velocity.27
Figure 8 shows that with a negative collateral shock and the benchmark rule
there is a fall in the loans made by banks along with a fall in consumption,
ination and employment in the goods sector. With the augmented rule
the e¤ect on ination is largely ameliorated. The e¤ect on assets prices
is reversed and the decline in bank lending is very slight and temporary.
The e¤ect on the EFP is the same in both cases but the augmented rule
helps to short circuit the e¤ects of the supply shock on ination, asset prices
and bank lending. For the shock to velocity, Figure 9, again the e¤ect is
to better stabilise this economy, with goods sector employment, real wages,
consumption and ination each becoming less volatile. The policy rate itself
also has to move by less in this case and loans supply returns back to its
initial level with no overshoot, which is found in the case of the benchmark
rule.
As a nal illustration of the models properties with and without the
augmented rule, we simulate the model stochastically by repeatedly shocking
productivity, velocity, collateral and monitoring. Figure 10 shows, mirroring
Figure 1, the paths for real money growth (dotted line) and the external
nance premium (solid line) over 100 time periods in four simple scenarios.
The rst charts shows the real money stock deviation from steady state and
the EFP over a simulated 25 year period and we can observe a similar cyclical
variance and positive covariance. The chart below simulates the same time
series with the augmented policy rule and suggests no substantial change in
the behaviour of the simulated time series. The chart in the upper right of the
panel corresponds to the case of the benchmark rule with a dominant role for
26How the central bank should measure money and the EFP in reality, given the
preponderance of possible measures, and then learn by about the appropriate weight
on m constructing priors and updating posteriors we leave to future work.
27The results for shocks to productivity and monitoring are available on request.
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banking sector shocks and suggests both an sharp increase in the volatility of
observed real money balances and the EFP and a negative correlation. If on
the other hand, we adopt the augmented rule, there is a clear reduction in the
volatility of real money balances. Here we can see that the augmented rule is
able to reduce the variability substantially compared to the benchmark rule,
suggesting some substantial gain from the employment of the augmented rule
in the presence of dominant shocks emanating from the nancial sector. The
observation that money has been missed in this cycle may follow.
The correlations between ination, money and EFP are tabulated for
the di¤erent cases in Table 4. Along the diagonals we show the standard
deviation of money, ination and the EFP for the benchmark simulation,
banking shocks dominant simulation and one with the standard policy rule
and for the augmented policy rule. It is the numerical equivalent of Figure
10. In this case the standard deviation of money and EFP are not altered
greatly by the augmented rule, suggesting that the augmented rule does not
help stabilise the economy over and above a simple rule. The correlations
between money, ination and the external nance premium are similar when
we adopt either the benchmark and the augmented rule.
On the right hand side of the panel we report the correlations when
banking shocks dominate. The correlation between money and ination
which is positive with the benchmark rule becomes negative with the
augmented rule. Similarly the correlation between money and the EFP, which
is negative with the benchmark rule, is reduced further once the augmented
rule is in place - as the rule exploits the joint information from money and
asset prices. Under the augmented rule, with a predominance of banking
shocks, the volatility of money and particularly ination are reduced.
We treat the evidence here as illustrative of the extent to which an
augmented rule, which accounts for the joint information from money and
nancial spreads, may help stabilise a monetary economy. The identication
of this information involves the simple insight that money growth and
nancial spreads will move in opposite directions under supply shocks to
money markets and, provided a suitable measure of money (or liquidity) and
a constellation of nancial spreads can be located, some weight might be
given to a rule of this form for monetary policy analysis.
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5 Conclusions
In a monetary economy, it seems very unlikely that developments in money
markets do not matter. Disruptions to money markets since August 2007
have led to nancial market spreads widening and some contraction in the
availability of liquidity for the private sector. To some extent this is the
mirror of the situation in recent years when nancial spreads have narrowed
when liquidity has been ample. The role of money to both originate as well
as reect or amplify shocks seems important. When setting monetary policy,
central bankers purport to monitor monetary developments (to varying
degrees) but there seems to be little clear guidance as to how this information
is to be used, if at all. In this paper we examined the role of money in
a DSGE model with an integrated banking sector that supplies loans and
accepts deposits along the lines of Goodfriend and McCallum (2007).28 We
establish the pivotal role of the external nance premium. While in normal
circumstances money conveys no extra information to a Central Bank about
the state of the economy over and above that in ination, this is not true
when there are shocks to the supply of credit coming through collateral and
the costs of monitoring a loan portfolio.29 In these circumstances if the
Central Bank responds in some measure to movements in the spread between
money and the external nance premium, a much greater degree of control
of ination can be achieved.
Technical Appendix
A Model Set Up
This is a modied version of the Goodfriend and McCallums model (2007)
incorporating a government (including central bank) budget constraint and
a cash-in-advance constraint with stochastic velocity of money demand.
Utility function:
U = E0
1X
t=0
t[ log(ct) + (1  ) log(1  nst  mst)] (20)
28In some sense we follow the second conjecture of Christiano et al (2007).
29Lown and Morgan, 2006, report that the loan o¢ cer surveys do have signicant
exogenous information for business cycle.
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ct denotes real consumption, nst is supply of labour in goods sector and m
s
t
is the supply of monitoring work in the banking sector.
 Budget constraint:
qt(1  )Kt + Bt
PAt
+
Ht 1
PAt
+ wt(n
s
t +m
s
t) + c
A
t (
Pt
PAt
)1  (21)
 wt(nt +mt)  Ht
PAt
  taxt   qtKt+1   Bt+1
PAt (1 +R
B
t )
  ct = 0
qt is the price of capital, Kt is the quantity of capital, Pt is the price of
households produced good, PAt is the consumption good price index, nt is
the labour demanded by household as producer, mt; is the labour demanded
by households banking operation, wt is the real wage, Ht is the nominal
holding of high powered money, taxt is the real lump-sum tax payment, RBt
is the nominal interest rate on government bonds purchased in t and mature
in t+1; Bt+1. The Lagrangian multiplier of this constraint is denoted as, t:
 Sales equal net production constraint:
Kt (A1tnt)
1    cAt (Pt=PAt )  = 0 (22)
A1t is a productivity shock in the goods production sector whose mean
increases over time at a rate . In (18) and (19) the superscript A indicates
that the variable is an aggregate taken as given from each household. The
Lagrangian multiplier of this constraint is denoted as, t:
 Government (including central bank budget constraint):
Tt = gt   taxt = Ht
PAt
  Ht 1
PAt
+
Bt+1
PAt (1 +R
B
t )
  Bt
PAt
(23)
gt is real government expenditure and Tt is real government lump-sum
transfer.
 Deposit/money constraint:
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ct = vtDt=P
A
t (24)
Vt denotes velocity and Dt are deposits.
 Bank balance sheet:
Ht + Lt = Dt (25)
Dt = Lt=(1  rr)
Ht is high-powered money, Lt is the amount of loans and rr is the fractional
reserve/deposit ratio which is assumed to be constant.
 Production function pertaining to management of loans:
Lt=P
A
t = F (bt+1 + A3tkqtKt+1)
(A2tmt)
1  0 <  < 1 (26)
with
bt = Bt+1=P
A
t (1 +R
B
t ) (27)
From (24):
ct = vt
F (bt+1 + A3tkqtKt+1)
(A2tmt)
1 
PAt (1  rr)
(28)
A2t denotes a shock to monitoring work, A3t is a shock on capital as
collateral. The parameter k denotes the inferiority of capital as collateral
in the banking production function, while  is the share of collateral in the
loan production function. For a complete list of all variables and parameters
in the model see Tables A.1 and A.2.
A.1 First Order Conditions
 Derivative with respect to mst and nst of (20) and (21)
  (1  )
1  nst  mst
+ wtt = 0 (29)
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 Derivative with respect to mt.

ct
@ct
@mt
  twt   t @ct
@mt
= 0 (30)
wt = (

tct
  1) @ct
@mt
Given:
ct =
vtDt
PAt
=
vtLt
PAt (1  rr)
=
vtF (bt+1 + A3tkqtKt+1)
(A2tmt)
1 
(1  rr) (31)
then
@ct
@mt
=
1  
mt
ct
So (30) becomes:
wt = (

tct
  1)1  
mt
ct (32)
 Derivative with respect to nt
twt = tA1t(1  )(
K
ntA1t
) (33)
wt =
t
t
A1t(1  )( K
ntA1t
)
 Derivative with respect to Kt+1

ct
@ct
@Kt+1
+Ett+1qt+1(1 ) qtt t @ct
@Kt+1
+Ett+1K
 1
t (A1tnt)
1 
(34)
Given
@ct
@Kt+1
=
ctA3tkqt
bt+1 + A3tkqtKt+1
(35)
= 
A3tkqt
where
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 =
ct
bt+1 + A3tkqtKt+1
(36)
then (34) can be rewritten:
(

ctt
  1)
A3tkqt++Ett+1
t
qt+1(1  )  qt+Et

t+1
t
t+1
t+1
(
A1tnt
Kt
)1 

(37)
 Derivative with respect to Pt:
0 = t(1  )cAt (Pt) (PAt ) (1 ) + tcAt (Pt)  1(PAt ) (38)
t
t
=
   1

Pt
PAt
 Derivative with respect to Bt+1

ct
@ct
@Bt+1
  t @ct
@Bt+1
+ Et
t+1
PAt+1
  t
PAt (1 +R
B
t )
= 0
Given
@ct
@Bt+1
=


PAt (1 +R
B
t )
then
=


tct
  1



PAt (1 +R
B
t )
+ Et
t+1
PAt+1
  t
PAt (1 +R
B
t )
(39)
=


tct
  1


  1 + Et

t+1
t
PAt
PAt+1
(1 +RBt )

:
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A.2 Interest Rates
FOC with respect to ct gives 
Ut;C
t
  1

= 0 (40)
where UC =

ct
: Substituting in (39) gives riskless rate RT :
1 +RTt = Et
tP
A
t+1
t+1Pt+1
(41)
The interest rate on bonds, RB; is derived from (39):
RTt  RBt =

UC
t
  1


t =


ctt
  1


t (42)
So UC
t
measures the household marginal utility relative to households
shadow value of funds while 
 is the marginal value of collateral.
While
RLt  RBt =

Ut;C
t
  1

k
t (43)
where k determines to which capital is collateralisable.
To nd the interbank rate RIB we must equate marginal product of loans
per unit of labour mt (1   ) Ltmt to their marginal cost wtPAt where loans are
dened as Lt = Dt(1  rr) = ctP
A
t
vt
(1  rr): So the di¤erence between rates is
equal to real marginal cost of loan management:
RTt  RIBt =

vtmtwt
(1  )(1  rr)ct

(44)
Since (1  ) is the factor share of monitoring, the marginal cost of loan
production is multiplied by (1  ) and the relevant relationship becomes:
RLt  RIBt =

vtmtwt
(1  rr)ct

(45)
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B Steady-State
For the productivity and monitoring shocks we assume a trend growth rate
equal to A2t = A1t = (1+ )t: In steady state q = 1; A2 = A1 = (1+ );
 shrinks at rate  so t+1
t
= 1
(1+)
and there is no ination so P = PA = 1
while K is constant:
From (36):

 =

( b
c
+ kqK
c
)
(46)
From (29)
1  
1  n m = w (47)
From (32):
w = (

c
  1)(1  ) c
m
(48)
From (38) 

=  1

: Replacing in (33):
w =
   1

(1  )

K
n

(49)
From (37):
(

c
  1)
kq + 1
1 + 
q(1  )   q + Et

1
1 + 


(
n
K
)1 

= 0 (50)
(

c
  1)
kq   1 + 
1 + 

(1  ) +    1

(
n
K
)1 

= 0
From (21), (22):
1 =

K
c
 n
c
1 
  K
c
(51)
From (23)
T =  RBb (52)
where b = ebc, eb is steady state debt-to-output ratio in calibration.
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C The Linearised Model
The model is composed by the following linearised equations.30
Supply Labour (from (29)):
n
(1  n m)bnt + m(1  n m) bmt   bt   bwt = 0 (A1)
Demand for Labour (from (32)):
bmt + bwt + (1  )c
mw
bct + 

bt = 0 (A2)
Supply of Banking Services (combining (25) and (26))31:
bct = bvtc+ (1  )(a2t + bmt) + (A3)


bc
bc+ (1 + )kK
(bct +bbt) + kK(1 + )
bc+ (1 + )kK
(a3t + bqt)
reported in the main text as:
ct = bvtc+ (1  )(a2t + bmt) +   b
b+ k1
(bct +bbt) + k1
b+ k1
(a3t + bqt) :
where k1 =
(1+)kK
c
:
CIA constraint (from (24)):
bct + bPt = bHt + bvt (A4)
Aggregate Supply (combining (33) and (51)):
bct = (1  )(1 + K
c
)(a1t + bnt) (A6)
Marginal cost: cmct = bnt + bwt   bct (A7)
30The model is dened in the Matlab le gmvsys.m. Standard deviation and
persistence structure of the stochastic variables are dened in the driver le
gmvdrv.m.
31The relationship is derived by setting b = B
P (1+RB)c
and bt+1 = btct where bt+1
is dened in (27).
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Mark-up (from (38)): cmct = bt   bt (A8)
Ination: bt = bpt   bpt 1 (A9)
Calvo pricing: bt = cmct + Etbt+1 + ut (A10)
Marginal Value of Collateralised Lending (from (36)):
b
t = kK
bc+ kK
(bct   bqt   a3t)  bc
bc+ kK
bbt (A11)
reported in the main text as:
b
t = k2
b+ k2
(bct   bqt   a3t)  b
b+ k2
bbt
where k2 = kKc :
Asset Pricing (from (39))32:
bqt 1  k
( 
c
  1)

= [
(1  )
1 + 
+
mc
1 + 
(
n
K
)1 ]

Etbt+1   bt+ (1  )
1 + 
Etbqt+1 +
k

c

 bct   bt+ k
( 
c
  1)
b
t + a3t+
mc
1 + 
(
n
K
)1 

Et [cmct+1 + (1  ) (bnt+1 + a1t+1)] (A12)
reported in the main text as:
bqt = (1 + 1)Etbt+1   bt+ 1Etbqt+1   k
c bct + bt+
k
(

c
  1)
b
t + a3t+ 1Et [cmct+1 + (1  ) (bnt+1 + a1t+1)]
where 1 =
(1 )
1+
and 1 =
mc
1+
( n
K
)1 :
32Note that in steady-state  = mc and
t+1
t
= 11+ :
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Government Budget Constraint33:
T bTt = H  bHt   bHt 1+ cbbbt   cb  1 +RB bbt 1   bt + bRBt 1 (A13)
Bond Holding: bbt = "t (A14)
Riskless Interest Rate (from (41)):bRTt = bt + Etbt+1   Etbt+1 (A15)
Liquidity Service of Bonds (from (39))34:
1 +RB
1 +RT
 bRBt   bRTt  = 
c bct + bt 


c
  1


b
t (A16)
External Finance Premium (from (44)):dEFP t = bvt + bwt + bmt   bct (A17)
Other Interest Rates: bRIBt = bRTt   dEFP t (A18)bRLt = bRIBt + dEFP t (A19)bRDt = bRIBt (A20)
Policy Feedback Rule:
bRIBt = bt + t (A21)
Velocity:
bvt = t (A22)
For notational convenience the relevant log-linearised equations with
variables denoting deviation from steady-state are reported in the main text
withoutb.
33We dene the percentage deviation from steady state of ow and stock variables by
lnxt   lnx, while for interest rates and ratio variables they are Rt = R + bRt (rates)
and rt = r + brt (ratio, assuming rt = xt=yt), respectively. It can be shown the
approximation comes from rst-order Taylor expansion: ex  1+x, while for rate variable:bRt  ln(1 +Rt)  ln(1 +R) and for ratio: brt = rt   r = ln(xt=yt)  ln(x=y) = bxt   byt.
34Log-linearisation of interest rate is dened as di¤erence from steady state:
Rt = R+ bRt:
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D Simulation
We consider contemporaneous shocks to a1; a2; a3; v: The benchmark
model has 20 endogenous variables fc; n;m;w; q; P; ;mc;H; b;
; EFP;
RT ; RB; RIB; RL; RD; ; ; Tg, 5 lagged variables fP 1; H 1; c 1; b 1; RB 1g
and 7 exogenous shocks fa1; a2; a3; "; ; ; ug. The equations (A1) through
(A22), 5 lagged identities construct the model to be solved by King and
Watson (1998) algorithm. To obtain the simulated series we have produced
10,000 draws for the shocks from a normal distribution and plotted the middle
100 time units. Table A.1 provides a complete list of the endogenous and
exogenous variables of the model and their meaning:
Table A.1 The Variables
c : Real consumption
n : Labour input
m : Labour input for loan monitoring, or banking employment
w : Real wage
q : Price of capital goods
P : Price level
 : Ination
mc : Marginal cost
H : Base money
b : Real bond holding

 : Marginal value of collateral
EFP : Uncollateralised External Finance Premium (RT - RIB)
LSY B Liquidity Service on Bonds
LSY KB Liquidity Service on Capital (kLSY B)
RT : Benchmark risk free rate
RB : Interest rate for bond
RIB : Interbank rate
RL : Loan rate
RD : Deposit rate
 : Lagrangian for budget constraint (shadow value of consumption)
 : Lagrangian for production constraint
T : Real lump-sum transfer
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D.1 Calibration
Table A.2 reports the values for the parameters and steady-state values of
relevant variables. Following Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) we choose
the consumption weight in utility, ; to yield 1/3 of available time in either
goods or banking services production. We also set the relative share of
capital and labour in goods production  to be 0.36. We choose the elasticity
of substitution of di¤erentiated goods, , to be equal to 11. The discount
factor, ; is set to 0.99 which is the canonical quarterly value while the mark-
up coe¢ cient in the Phillips curve, ; is set to 0.05. The depreciation rate,
, is set to be equal to 0.025 while the trend growth rate, ; is set to 0.005
which corresponds to 2% per year. The steady-state value of bond holding
level relative to GDP, eb, is set to 0.56 as of the third quarter of 2005.
The parameters linked to money and banking are dened as follows.
Velocity at its steady state level is dened as the ratio between US GDP and
M3 at fourth quarter 2005, yielding 0.31. The fractional reserve requirement,
rr ; is set at 0.005, measured as the ratio of US bank reserves to M3 as at
the fourth quarter 2005. The fraction of collateral, ; in loan production is
set to 0.65, the coe¢ cient reecting the inferiority of capital as collateral, k;
is set to 0.2 while the production coe¢ cient of loan, F; is set to 9. The low
value of capital productivity reects the facts that usually banks use higher
fraction of monitoring services and rely less on capital as collateral.
With this parameters values we see that the steady state of labour input,
n; is 0.31 which is close to 1/3 as required. The ratio of time working in the
banking service sector, m
m+n
; is 1.9% under the benchmark calibration, not far
the 1.6%, share of total US employment in depository credit intermediation
as of August 2005. As the steady-states are computed at zero ination we
can interpret all the rates as real rates. The riskless rate, RT ; is 6% per
annum. The interbank rate, RIB; is 0.84% per annum which is close to
the 1% per year average short-term real rate (see Campbell, 1999). The
government bond rate, RB; is 2.1% per annum. Finally the collateralised
external nance premium is 2% per annum which is in line with the average
spread of the prime rate over the federal funds rate in the US.
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Table A.2 Calibration
Parameter Description Value
 Discount factor 0.99
 Slope of Phillips curve 0.05
 Collateral share of loan production 0.65
 Consumption weight in utility 0.4
 Capital share of rm production 0.36
 Depreciation rate of capital 0.025
 Trend growth rate 0.005
rr Reserve ratio 0.005
F Production coe¢ cient of loan 9
k Relative Inferiority of capital as collateral 0.2
 Elasticity of substitution of di¤erentiated goods 11
RT Steady state of benchmark risk free rate 0.015
n Steady state of labour input 0.3195
m Steady state of banking employment 0.0063
RIB Steady state of interbank rate 0.0021
RL Steady state of loan rate 0.0066
RB Steady state of bond rate 0.0052eb Steady state of bond holding level 0.56
c Steady state of consumption 0.8409
w Steady state of real wage 1.9494
 Steady state of shadow value of consumption 0.457
V Steady state level of velocity 0.31

 Steady state of marginal value of collateral 0.237
K Steady state of Capital 9.19
Parametrisation can be changed in gmsys.m. Steady state of transfer
level, Lagrangian of production constraint and base money depend on above
parameters. Steady state marginal cost is mc =  1

.35
35The Matlab les using the King-Watson (1998) algorithm to solve the system and to
obtain the impulse responses and all the simulated series and simulation code are naturally
available on request.
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Table 1. Interest Rate Spreads
Interest Rate Description Equation
RTt Benchmark rate Et(t t+1) + Ett+1
RIBt Interbank (and policy) rate R
T
t   [vt + wt +mt   ct]
RBt Yield on government bonds R
T
t  



c
(ct + t) 
 

c
  1

t
RLt Interest rates on loans R
IB
t + [vt + wt +mt   ct]
RDt Deposit rate R
IB
t
RLt  RIBt External nance premium [vt + wt +mt   ct]
RTt  RBt Liquidity Service Yield on Bonds



c
(ct + t) 
 

c
  1

t
RLt  RDt Loan-Deposit spread [vt + wt +mt   ct]
Note: Variables with no time denotion are steady-state parameters (see technical
appendix for more details) all other terms with a subscript t are expressed as deviations
from steady state.
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Table 2. Calibration of exogenous shocks
Description Value Source
Persistence
a1 productivity shocks 0.95 King (2002)
a2 banking productivity shocks 0.95
a3 collateral shocks 0.9
 monetary policy shocks 0.3 King (2002)
u mark-up shocks 0.74 Smets and Wouters (2007)
" government debt shocks 0.9
v velocity shocks 0.33 King (2002)
Volatility
a1 productivity shocks 0.72% King (2002)
a2 banking productivity shocks 1.00%
a3 collateral shocks 1.00%
 monetary policy shocks 0.82% King (2002)
u mark-up shocks 0.11% Smets and Wouters (2007)
" government debt shocks 1.00%
v velocity shocks 1.00% King (2002)
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Table 3. The Information Content of Money
Shock Sign Shock Money EFP Info
Productivity + + + 
Monitoring + +   p
Collateral     + p
Velocity   + + 
Note: The direction of response is denoted here in qualitative terms from the impulse
response analysis shown in Figures 2-5.
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Table 4. Correlation between Money, Ination and the EFP
Simple ination-targeting policy rule
Benchmark Shocks Banking Shocks Dominant
M2t t EFPt M2t t EFPt
M2t 1:34%  0:59 0:59 5:85% 0:60  0:60
t 0:06%  0:97 1:31%  1:00
EFPt 2:98% 64:21%
Augmented policy rule
Benchmark Shocks Banking Shocks Dominant
M2t t EFPt M2t t EFPt
M2t 1:37%  0:89 0:64 2:41%  0:95  0:80
t 0:03%  0:56 0:05% 0:73
EFPt 3:05% 64:79%
Note: The table shows second moments of the key variables in calibrated models. Note
we consider a broad money similar to Figure 1. In the stylized model of Goodfriend and
McCallum, uctuations of monetary base Ht, loan or deposits Lt, Dt and broad money
M2t are identical. Variables are taken as deviations from steady states using HP lter.
In each of the triangular panel we calculate asymptotic contemporaneous correlations in
o¤-diagonal cells. Along the diagonal we calculate standard deviation.
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Figure 1: US Real Money Growth and the External Finance Premium
Note: We plot average growth rate of real money versus the external nance premium
averaged for last two years respectively. The real money growth is calculated as nominal
M2 adjusted by core CPI, both seasonal adjusted and taken from OECD Main Economic
Indicators. EFP is the di¤erence of annual yield in Moodys Baa- and Aaa- rated long
term corporate bonds.
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses to Productivity Shock under Ination Targeting
Note: In Figure 2-5 we report impulse responses of key variables under a benchmark
calibration of exogenous shocks and policy rate set by simple ination-targeting central
bank. Please refer to Technical Appendix for calibration values. The impulse responses
show percentage deviation from steady state from period 1 when there is a 1% shock of
magnitude to specic source of uctuation.
41
5 10 15 20
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
     Goods Sector Employment
5 10 15 20
0.005
0.01
0.015
     Real Wages
5 10 15 20
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
     Monitoring Employment
5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
x 10-3      Asset Price
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
in
 %
5 10 15 20
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
     Real Consumption
5 10 15 20
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
    Inflation
5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
    Deposits/Loans
5 10 15 20
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
    External Finance Premium
Quarters after shock
5 10 15 20
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
x 10 -3     Liquidi ty Yield
Figure 3: Impulse Responses to Monitoring Shock under Ination Targeting
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to Negative Collateral Shock under Ination
Targeting
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses to Velocity Shock under Ination Targeting
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Figure 6: Ination and Output Variances as a Function of Banking Sector
Shocks
Note: On x-axis we allow various calibration of banking sector shocks, the monitoring
productivity shock or collateral shock. ri ; i = y;  denotes relative standard deviation
of output or ination to the initial case (banking shocks are not dominant).
45
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Weight on (Money-EFP) in the Feedback Rule
R
el
at
ive
 S
ta
nd
ar
d 
D
ev
ia
tio
n
(O
ut
pu
t a
nd
 In
fla
tio
n)
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
rh,efp(rhs)
sr
p
sry
C
or
re
la
tio
n
Figure 7: Optimal Weight on Money and EFP in Augmented Policy Rule
Note: On x-axis we allow various calibration for coe¢ cient of augmented feedback
term, Money minus External Finance Premium. ri ; i = y;  denotes relative standard
deviation of output or ination to the initial case (zero weight on Money-EFP).
46
5 10 15 20
-0.1
-0.05
0
     Goods Sector Employment
5 10 15 20
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
     Real Wages
5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
     Monitoring Employment
5 10 15 20
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
     Asset Price
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
in
 %
5 10 15 20
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
     Real Consumption
5 10 15 20
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
    Inflation
5 10 15 20
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
    Deposits/Loans
5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
    External Finance Premium
Quarters after shock
5 10 15 20
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
    Interbank Rate
Benchmark
Augmented
Figure 8: Key Responses to Negative Collateral Shock under Benchmark and
Augmented Rule
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Figure 9: Key Responses to Velocity Shock under Benchmark and
Augmented Rule
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Figure 10: Simulation of Articial Time Series from Models
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